AU/ACSC/8930/AY06

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE JTF J4 IN JOINT EFFECTS WARGAME

By

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Preface

The purpose of this paper is to provide continuity and information dissemination for students of the ACSC Joint Effects Wargame. Specifically, this paper addresses the roles and missions of the Joint Task Force (JTF) J4 position. This paper will be broken down into three sections: what doctrine says about a JTF J4 organization, what I did as a member of the JTF J4 staff during this wargame, and the lessons learned for future JTF J4 wargame operations.

Abstract

Logistics is an incredibly important aspect of any military operation. In today's environment of global mobility, enroute staging bases and reduced oversees basing, the concepts and application of logistics becomes even more important. Each service has its own logistics doctrinal theory based loosely on joint doctrine. In any real world operation, the doctrine merely acts as the common framework or the point from which to deviate. The application of joint logistics doctrine in the joint effects wargame bore this out. The Army's view of logistics and sustainment tends to be ground centric, while the Air Force focuses on air movement. The interaction of students from both of these military schools allowed for a common understanding of capabilities and limitations of the sister services. In the final analysis, these inter-service conversations improved the understanding of truly joint logistics in a JTF environment.

Doctrine for JTF J4 operations

You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.

— General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Logistics is the process of planning and executing the projection, movement and sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of operating forces in the execution of national security policy [1]. Logistic functions include Supply, Maintenance, Transportation, Civil engineering, and Health services (see Figure 1). For each of the above functional areas, the combatant commander should consider four elements of the joint theater logistic process: procurement and contracting, distribution, sustainment, and disposition and disposal. JP 4-0 Appendix B lists the following key functions of a J4 staff:

a. Advise the COCOM on the Supportability of Proposed Operations or Courses of action (COAs).
b. Coordinate Logistic Support with Upcoming Operations.
c. Monitor Current and Evolving Theater Logistic Capabilities.
d. Act as the COCOM's Agent and Advocate to Non-theater Logistic Organizations.

There are numerous other functions and tasks that fall within the purview of the J4 but the four areas above encompass the primary areas of effort of the J4 staff. Of these four areas, advising the COCOM on the logistics feasibility with respect to any operation or plan is of critical importance.



Ref: JP 5-00.2, fig. VIII-1, p. VIII-3.

Figure 1 Typical JTF J4 Organization

The J4 directs or recommends to the COCOM, as appropriate, COAs with respect to allocation of common-user transportation capabilities when movement requirements exceeds capability or when competing requirements result in unresolved conflicts[2]. One method and tool that the J4 uses in the logistics feasibility estimate is the Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM) and the Movement Control System (Figure 2). Joint theater logistics management gives the combatant commander or JTF commander the tools to oversee the management of logistics effectively, enabling the commander's directive authority for logistics. JTLM ensures the right logistics—ranging from acquisition to disposal—at the right place and

time, and it encompasses all aspects of moving and sustaining the force. Sustainment requirements must be obtained from each of the services in order to coordinate, consolidate and prioritize requirements [1]. This requirement cannot be overstated. The J4 de-conflicts and coordinates common user requirements and those requirements submitted by the respective components. Only the service components have the expertise to forecast the unique logistics requirements of its units.



Ref: JP 4-01.3, Fig III-1, pg III-3

Figure 2 Joint Movement Center Organization



Ref: JP 4-01.3, Fig III-2, pg III-4

Figure 3 Requirements of a Theater Movement Control System

The J4, in short, is responsible for feeding the fight, ensuring that the war fighter has everything he or she needs to accomplish their assigned military objectives. As a goal, the J4 should seek to streamline the tooth to tail processes and remove any constraints that are in his area of responsibility. As the J4 employs and utilizes the logistics system, it is important to collaborate and coordinate with USTRANSCOM as a key logistics enabler.

USTRANSCOM is the distributed process owner (DPO) for the Department of Defense and is responsible for "….improving the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution-related activities: deployment, sustainment, and redeployment support during peace and war. In addition, the DPO serves as the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the strategic distribution system"[3]. Part of this new process is the USTRANSCOM

Deployment/Distribution Operations Center (DDOC). When deployed this center is normally placed within the regional combatant commander J4 division. The DDOC will ensure that logistics movements arrive in theater on schedule and will provide in transit visibility (ITV) and force tracking throughout the movement process.

Doctrine for J4 operations is fairly detailed with a multitude of source documents, including individual service components, which can be used as a starting point from which to begin logistics planning and execution considerations. It should be noted that each service begins with joint doctrine and develops its own respective service doctrine. Although each service doctrine should support the joint master publications, the service interpretations of joint doctrine may vary widely. Some of these issues surfaced during the execution of this wargame.

Actual ACSC JTF J4 execution for AY06

My logisticians are a humorless lot…they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.

— Alexander the Great

As a member of the J4 directorate for this exercise, there are numerous items to coordinate and execute. Some of these items come straight from doctrine, while others are a unique requirement constrained by the parameters of this exercise. One of the duties of the J4 is to brief the JFC/CC, which for the planning portions of this exercise was the course director. The purpose behind these briefings is two fold. First, these briefing will provide your peers with an overview of theater logistics planning and considerations. Secondly, these briefings ensure that the J4 planning is on track and covering the necessary items to accomplish the J4 duties during wargame execution. One of the briefings that the J4 provides is a briefing on Air Force agile combat support limitations and compensations. This briefing specifically addresses the logistics considerations concerning agile combat support. Some of these considerations are: host nation basing and fuel / water support, foreign states' overflight clearance, secure access requirements, airlift or port dependency for sustainment. The U.S. Air Force employs compensations to overcome these limitations; political alliances, pre-planned host-nation-agreements, self reliant security integrated into deployment package, Modular capability (small contingency response group (CRG)) to robust base operating support (BOS) AEF packages, Pre-positioning of resources (WRM/PREPO), warm forward bases, and continuous global assessment activity. This briefing will set the stage to develop and brief a J4 concept of logistics support for the strategic

estimate brief once the commanders' guidance is received. The following concept of logistics support was proposed for AY06:

- The JTF J4 will be established IAW JP 5-00.2 w/ a LRC
- Anticipated shortages of critical munitions requires those items be pushed/prioritized
- Forces should deploy with initial sustainment requirements and each service should implement "push" logistics until initial stockage levels are met (see Fig 4)
- USTRANSCOM will deploy a DDOC element to EUCOM J4 to coordinate and track all strategic logistics movements
- Primary APOD is Tbilisi, secondary is Yevlakh
- Primary SPOD is Poti, secondary is Batumi
- Utilize HN capabilities to the max extent possible to minimize footprint, US transportation and support requirements.
- Request WRM Afloat assets be moved into the Black Sea

Additional logistical support considerations are: transit times to theater (air and sea), as well as intra theater transit times (air and ground), status and availability of logistics in theater and available. A request for the initial TPFDD is necessary in order to establish a realistic logistics feasibility analysis. The J4 should act as the honest broker and provide the JTF/CC with an initial logistics feasibility assessment, as well as possible alternatives to logistics problems. One of these alternatives that can be very effective for long-term logistics sustainment is sealift. Sealift is an incredibly robust capability and can provide massive logistics support if properly planned for before operations commence [4].



Ref: MCDP 4, Fig 6, pg 66

Figure 4 Push vs Pull Distribution

The J4 will coordinate and task the A4 for those items that are air centric. It is important to understand the roles and missions of the A4. As an Air Force member of the joint staff, during this exercise, you will, by default, represent the air force A4. Some of the roles and missions of the J4 are:

- A4 Logistics [5]
  - Track COMAFFOR ammunition and fuel support capability
  - Identify and track transportation movement requirements
  - Arrange/coordinate COMAFFOR host-nation support requirements with JTF J4
  - Coordinate inter-service agreements for supply/support with JTF J4
  - Exercise staff supervision or cognizance over applicable aircraft maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations
  - Track and coordinate theater aerial ports and theater distribution processes affecting US Air Force operations
  - Plan for and establish forward operating bases, as directed, to sustain effective operations
  - Coordinate overall COMAFFOR combat support functions/requirements -- maintain liaisons with combat support functions of other components and JTF J4

- Advise CC concerning combat support matters that affect accomplishment of COMAFFOR missions
- Establish and operate logistics readiness center.
- Identify, coordinate, and track combat support requirements
- Ensure deployed forces are sustained from onset of operations
- Include CONUS resupply and reachback, procurement of supplies and services from local sources within deployment locations, time definite delivery movements, theater distribution with JTF J4 and other services, and timely retrograde of personnel and reparable materiel
- Formulate COMAFFOR combat support policies
- Provides combat support expertise to Strategy Division in the AOC
- Coordinate beddown of US Air Force forces
- Coordinate COMAFFOR common item supply support w/ JTF LRC

This list of A4 functions provides some insight between the connection and functions of a component logistics division and the J4. Taking all of the above items into consideration will provide a solid baseline to execute J4 duties during the wargame.

During the execution phase at CGSC, one of the action items that were required was a list of logistics boards that the JTF J4 would stand up. Although the J4 did not stand these boards up, the "white cell" wanted those boards notionally established and the proper questions were directed to the notional logistics boards (Fig. 5). Additionally, there was a requirement to produce a daily LOGSITREP (Fig. 11). This joint level report included information regarding the status of munitions in theater, force deployment data, etc. The data was not included in the brief but the LOGSITREP represented those items that would be important to the JTF/CC and the J4 during a real world contingency. During the initial phases of the logistics assessment, it became clear that additional lift would be required. With the concurrence of the JFACC/DIRMOBFOR, the J4 forwarded a request through EUCOM to USTRANSCOM for six dedicated C-17s for use by the JFC/CC for the duration of this operation (see RFI's Fig. 11). This request was approved and enabled the JFC to develop reasonable COA's that required the

movement of heavy armored division through the theater. This was also necessary because of the lack of ground movement capability identified by an Army member of the J4.

The sustainment requirement for munitions became an issue for the J4. Doctrinally, the using service component would provide that data to the J4. During the exercise, the A4 was nonexistent and no one was able to provide the projected munitions consumption rate. This projection is essential for the J4 cell to provide the proper sustainment response. In the future, either the A4 or the white cell should be able to provide this data to the J4.

The integration with the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) proved invaluable from the J4 perspective. Issues regarding interagency support as well as what capabilities these agencies have proved enlightening. This interaction provided another educational opportunity for both the members of the JIACG but also the members of the J4 staff. In future operations the members of this staff will not overlook those capabilities of these governmental and non-governmental agencies.

The deployment of the USTC (USTRANSCOM) DDOC demonstrated some seams in its current doctrinal application. Those USTC forces that deploy to a theatre but are not chopped to the JTF are still under the control of USTC. Will the DDOC in theater act as the controlling/reporting agency for those USTC assets? During this exercise the answer was yes, the notional DDOC became the executing and coordinating agency between the DIRMOBFOR, and those USTC dedicated assets.

During the execution of this exercise, because there was no A4 established on the AFFOR staff the AF representative to the J4 staff fielded and answered questions on its behalf. One such question asked on behalf of the CFLCC was, "How much strategic lift can this theater absorb daily?" Doctrinally, questions such as this would have been resolved between the A4 and

DIRMOBFOR staff. Questions regarding expected PGM consumption would have been resolved through the A4 and A3 staffs as well.

Overall, wargame execution concerning J4 operations was as expected and for the most part in accordance with joint doctrine. It was interesting to note that many of my joint peers had not yet studied joint doctrine but were thoroughly versed in their respective service doctrine. This interaction created an outstanding educational opportunity.

Lessons Learned

Logistics must be simple - everyone thinks they're an expert.

—Anonymous

AY06 was the first attempt at a joint wargame and as such, there were a number of areas where improvements can be made. Some of the key areas from a logistics standpoint that require greater fidelity or improvement are: TPFDD analysis, site survey and beddown planning capabilities, and prior coordination with the other J4 team members. There are numerous opportunities in this exercise to reinforce or create important learning points. If the mechanisms are not in place that allow for the development and synthesis of these learning points then that opportunity will be lost.

There was no TPFDD provided during the early planning stages of this wargame, only a list of available forces. Without a robust TPFDD, it was difficult to perform an adequate logistics' feasibility/requirements analysis. This lack of a TPFDD data made it difficult to determine what forces were currently in theater as well as determine true force closure dates. Some of this was resolved by submitting multiple RFI's to the white cell. The "white cell" for this exercise was another area that needs improvement. In exercises this large, the "white cell" is typically a very robust organization with a broad range of expertise that allows for feedback that is realistic and timely from higher HQ or other agencies.

Initial beddown planning was problematic due to the conflicting data that made it difficult to provide substantiated recommendations to the JTF/CC and the components. In the future, a baseline should be established for all data, in this instance GDSS for all airfields in theater. The

integration of the JIACG and real world participants from US State Department, USAID and other NGO's was very beneficial. This integration led to productive planning concerning the capabilities and limitations of these various agencies. Additionally, this coordination provided for synergistic effects when coordinating host nation logistics requirements, NGO airlift movement and IDP coordination.

The lack of IWS availability at CGSC severely constrained the collaborative process. If there had been adequate technological support it would have greatly improved the wargame execution. Additionally, the faculty advisor assigned to the J4 provided daily guidance and feedback on the actions and progress of the J4 staff. This feedback was very beneficial in providing the J4 staff with a constant positive vector.

It was readily apparent that the JTF organizational structure was functionally based in a very ground centric manner, almost a CFLCC plus. Although the function and application of the J4 sustainment cell was doctrinally based and applied other cells in the JTF organization did not fully incorporate the expertise of its air force members. In the future, prior coordination before wargame start with the entire JTF staff may preclude some of these problems and enhance overall student effectiveness.

Conclusions

Amateurs worry about strategy. Dilettantes worry about tactics. Professionals worry about logistics.

—Anonymous

As the first year of this ACSC wargame commences there are numerous areas to improve and seams to remove. However, the overriding mantra of this project was to "have the conversation" with our peers at ACSC, Leavenworth and Rhode Island. From this authors point of view that objective was clearly accomplished. The interaction within the J4 cell was outstanding. The JTF J4 cell was staffed with representatives from the US Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force. This truly joint organization allowed for many discussions regarding how each service component approaches logistics and sustainment. As an Air Force member of this organization, many informal discussions were initiated that included discussions on "How does the Air Force CRG take over an airfield from a USMC/DAACG" and "Why isn't the Air Force more responsive to my (CFLCC) immediate lift requests." Discussions of this type were abundant among all members of the J4 staff.

In general, this was a very productive exercise that provided the invaluable opportunity to plan with joint and coalition peers in a collaborative JTF environment. The size of this exercise was appropriate for the stated objectives. The exercise could be dramatically improved with improved technological infrastructure on the part of CGSC and IWS investment. If the intent of this exercise is to grow and integrate the entire ACSC student body then it will take significant investment and coordination. The greatest areas for improvement are JTF organization and true joint organizational integration and technological investment in collaborative infrastructure. The

biggest positive, having a knowledgeable faculty advisor with recent/relevant experience provide daily feedback and direction contributed to a very effective and positive exercise experience for the J4 staff. CGSC will be moving into a new facility that may enable greater collaboration with improved technological support. I would recommend continuing next years exercise with the same student size applying the lessons learned to improve the overall wargame experience. Overall, this was a great experience and an outstanding educational exercise. I would highly recommend this exercise to any student who may find themselves on a JTF staff.

Attachments

This section provides data that was created & submitted during the JTF J4 execution of the AY06 wargame. It may provide a starting point for future wargame planning and discussion.

Centers and Joint Boards

- Logistics Readiness Center (LRC)
- Joint Movement Center (JMC)
  - Deconflict port capabilities, transportation asset availability, priorities
- Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board
  - Policies, priorities for civil-military construction, engineer req'ts. Arbitrates JFUB
- Joint Patient Movement Requirement Center
  - Chair: JTF J1 Surgeon. Coordinates patient movement out of the JOA
- Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO)
  - CFLCC executive agent. Search, recovery, identification, disposition.
- Joint Transportation Board (JTB)
  - Coordinate common-user transportation resources
- Sub-Area Petroleum Office (SAPO)
  - Subordinate to Joint Petroleum Office. Develop JOA fuel req'ts
- Joint Munitions Board
  - Coordinates resupply and allocation
- Area Joint Blood Program Office
  - Receipt, distribution, processing, storage and disposition
- Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board
  - Recommends priorities for allocations of JTF critical materiel assets

Figure 5 Notional Centers and Boards for JTF exercise

Last	First	Service	SPECIALTY	AIRCRAFT	Exercise Job
Borja	Robert	Air Force	Support	Communications	J4
Halverson	Eric (ACSC)	Air Force	Airlift	C-130	J4
Kennerly	Patrick	Air Force	Support	Logistics	J4
Loa	Jorge	Navy	Human Resources		J4
Lynch	Timothy	Army	OD	Logistics	J4
Oldham	Kenneth	USMC	Log	Logistics	J4 Lead
Schiller	Kevin	Air Force	Airlift & Refueling	KC-135/C-17	J4
Vandeveer	Mark	Air Force	Civil Engineering	Fuels	J4

Figure 6 Makeup of J4 Sustainment Cell for AY06

COA COMPARISON/DECISION ISSUES

COA 1 - JTF Pre-emptive.

1) Potential to exceed controlled supply rate for munitions, particularly in PGM's.
2) Risk that Strat Lift (5 day surge) could overwhelm theater's ability to receive and distribute material.
3) LOCs tenuous for re-supply of JSOTF in southern Azerbaijan and Nexcivan (no secure ground LOCs, only air LOCs) Potential requirement to support HA operations is above and beyond the initial capabilities of the JTF.
4) Potential requirement to support HA operations is beyond the initial capabilities of the JTF.

COA 2 – JTF Reactive.

1) Risk in moving significant amounts of combat power by Strat Lift (SAMs threat to strategic lift in theater)
2) Stresses LOCS (road, rail and air movements).
3) Sustainment for Nexcivan is difficult due to lack of secure LOCs.
4) Potential requirement to support HA operations is beyond the initial capabilities of the JTF.

The show stopper is the ability of the SAPA/AH to interdict/close the air/land LOCs.

Figure 7 J4 COA Analysis for AY06

ICAO	Airfield	Near City	Country	Mog	Ops hours	cargo/day	Pax/day	C-17 equiv sorties	5 day pax	5 day cargo (s/ton)
UGGG	LOCHINI	TBILISI	GEORGIA.	4	24	1130	6310	25	31550	5650
UG15	TBILISI MARNEULI	S TBILISI	GEORGIA.	2	16	377	2103	8	10515	1885
UBBB	HEYDAR ALIYEV	BAKU BINA	AZ	4	24	1130	6310	25	31550	5650
UBBG	GYANDZHA	GANJA (Kirvobad)	AZ	4	24	1130	6310	25	31550	5650
UBK4	KYURDAMIR	YEVLAKH	AZ	2	16	377	2103	8	10515	1885
UBN3	NASOSNAYA	WNW Baku	AZ	2	16	377	2103	8	10515	1885
								100	**126195**	**22605**

Figure 8 Theater Throughput Calculations based on AFPAM 10-1403

	LOC	Unit	Type	APS C-17 Sortie	Dest	In Place NLT	Notes
Strat	CEGE / CONUS	Hvy Ready CO	Maneuver (Hvy)	14	Baku	C+6	Initial Reserve
Strat	CEGE / CONUS	457 CHEM BN (-)	SPT	1	Yevlakh	C+7	Chem Def / Decon
Strat	CEGE / Germany	937 EN BDE	SPT	22	Baku	C+8	Bridging Capability
Strat	CEGE / Germany	377 TSC (-)	SUST	26	Baku	C+9	MI, SC, CSS
				63			
	Tbilisi	26 MEU(SOC) (+)	Maneuver (Hvy)	18	Baku	C+7	MEU + armor
	Poti	4th INF DIV (-)	C2	2	Yevlakh	C+7	HHC, C2, SIG
	Tbilisi	2 MEB (-)	Maneuver	2	Baku	C+8	HHC, C2, AVN SPT
	Poti	1/41 ADA BN (-)	AAMDC	8	Yevlakh	C+6	TBMD
	Poti	2x ADA BTRY (1/41 ADA)	AAMDC	6	Baku	C+6	TBMD
	Poti	4th Fires BDE (-)	SPT	16	Ganja	C+9	HHC, C2, ATACMS
	Poti	4th AVN BDE (-)	SPT / SUST	4	Ganja	C+9	HHC, C2, AVN SPT
	Poti	5/52 ADA BN (-)	AAMDC	8	Batman	C+10	TBMD to Turkey
	Poti	2x ADA BTRY (5/52 ADA)	AAMDC	6	Van	C+10	TBMD to Turkey
				70			
			Total Requirement	**133**			

Figure 9 Heavy Lift 5 Day Requirement

Component					
DTG AS OF 2400	Day		Hour		Min
	Month		Year		
DTG Prepared	Day		Hour		Min
	Month		Year		

Personnel Status Summary

a. Current Personnel Strength

Unit	Officers		Warrants		Enlisted		Totals		
	Auth	**Asg**	**Auth**	**Asg**	**Auth**	**Asg**	**Auth**	**Asg**	**%**
JTF									
CJFLCC									
CJFACC									
JFMCC									
JSOFT									
JPOTF									

b. Personnel Strength Projection

	Assigned	KIA	WIA-RTD Next 24 Hrs	EVAC Next 24 Hrs	Replacements next 24HR	Projected Total
JTF						
CJFLCC						
CJFACC						
JFMCC						
JSOFT						
JPOTF						

2. System Status

a. Ground Systems

ITEM	*AUTH*	*FMC*	*Repair 24 hrs*	*Repair 48 hrs*	*Battle loss last 24 hrs*
M1 TANK					
M2/3 FV					
LAV					
AAV7A1					
STRYKER					
MLRS					
M109A6					
M777 LW 155T					
M198 105T					
MTVR					
TPQ-36					
TPQ-37					
BSFV					

AVENGER					
120-mm MRTR					
ACE					
MICLIC					
SEE					
AVLB					
AVLM					
DOZER					
5-T WRCKR					
HEMMT WRKR					
HEMMT CGO					
LVS (USMC)					
HEMMT FUEL					
5K TANKER					
M1074 PLS					
M1075 PLS					
5-TCARGO					
HET TRACTOR					
HET TRAILER					
TRK, TRACKTOR					
SEMITRAILER					
ROWPU					
6K F/L					
10K F/L					
M88 RCVRY					
577 CARR					
M1059 SMIK CAR					
M93 FOX					
M996 AMB					
M997 AMB					

b. Air Systems

ITEM	*AUTH*	*FMC*	*Repair 24 hrs*	*Repair 48 hrs*	*Battle loss last 24 hrs*
EA6B					
S6					
E-3					
E-8					
F-22					
F-35					
F15					
F16					
F18					
A-10					
AV-8B					
MV-22					
KC-135					
KC-130					
KC-10					

EP-130					
MC-130					
C-130					
EP-3					
GR-1					
GR-3					
GR-4					
GR-7					
F-3					
UH-1					
AH-64					
CH-47					
UH-60L					
HH-60					
CH-46					
MH-53					
CH-53					
RQ-1					
MQ-1					

c. Maintenance Assessment

MAINTENCE STATUS REMARKS:

a. Class I

Item	*ON HAND*	*Forecast 72 hrs*
MRE		
UGR		
T-Ration		
Water		

b. Class III (gallons).

Item	*Capacity (gal)*	*ON HAND*	*Forecast 72 hrs*
JP8			
MOGAS			
Kerosene			
Diesel			

d. Class IV (Pack)

Item	*Capacity (gal)*	*ON HAND*	*Forecast 72 hrs*

A			
B			

e. Class V (round) -
mandatory reporting.

DODIC	NOMENCLATURE	O/H	72HR REQ
A109	AGM-65 Maverick		
A110	AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile		
A120	AGM-86C Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM)		
A130	AGM-86D CALCM Penetrator Missile		
A135	AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM)		
A140	AGM-129A Advanced Cruise Missile		
A150	AGM-130 Standoff Attack Weapon		
A160	AGM-142 Weapon System		
AI20	AIM-7M Sparrow		
AI30	AIM-9M Sidewinder		
AI40	AIM-9X		
AI50	AIM-120 AMRAAM		
C110	CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition (CEM)		
C120	CBU-89 GATOR		
C130	CBU-97 Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW)		
D061	155MM SADARM		
D501	155MM FASCAM		
D510	155MM CPHD		
D563	155MM DPICM		
D864	155MM DPICMBB		
G220	GBU-10/12/24/27/28		
G310	GBU-15 Guided Standoff Weapon		
G320	GBU-31/32 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)		
G330	GBU-XX Small Diameter Bomb (SDB)		
H104	MLRS DPICM		
H186	ER MLRS DPICM		
J143/M913	MICLIC		
J200	Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)		
J300	Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)		
K045/J003	VOLCANO		
LGB	Laser Guided Bombs		
N/A	ATACMS BLK 2		
N/A	ATACMS BLK 2A		
PA34	JAVELIN AT		
PC28	PATRIOT		
PG210	20MM		
	25MM		
PG220	30MM		
PG230	40MM		
PG320	105MM		
PGU	Series Ammunition		
PL38	ATACMS BLK 1A		
PL81	ATACMS BLK 1		
PU55	LONGBOW RF		
PV29	HELLFIRE		

f. Class VIII

	NOMENCLATURE	O/H	72HR REQ
Blood			
Bandages			
Triage kits			
Gloves			
Aspirin			

3. POD Status

POD	Status	Anticipated Change	Remarks
Kutaisi-APOD			
Tbilisi Lochini-APOD			
Baku Bina-APOD			
Kirvoabad - APOD limited			
Yevlakh - APOD limited			
Poti-SPOD			
Batumi-SPOD			

4. MSRs

MSR	Status	Anticipated Change	Remarks
Chevy			
Ford			
Dodge			
Pinto			
Mustang			

5. Force Projection

				% Complete			
Unit	Component	Integration date	Received	Staged	OM	Integrated	TOA Complete

6. Health Service Support

Hospital Bed Capacity

Unit		Component	Location		Capacity	Current Fill	Projected Fill Next 24 Hrs	Projected Fill Next 48 Hrs	Projected Fill Next 72 Hrs

7. Class VIII

Figure 10 JTF J4 LOGSTAT Format

EUCOM Answers to JTF J4 RFI's
22 Mar 06

J4

1. (EUCOM) Is LOGCAP available (EUCOM)
Yes, fully postured to execute $2M/day in supporting services
2. (STATE) What US AID capability (Infrastructure repair, humanitarian assistance) is in JOA?
Refer to hardcopy reply given 21 Mar. Check with JIACG.
3. (STATE) What Host Nation (Azerbaijan) capability (HET, Fuel transportation/delivery, barrier material is available?
Yes. Limited rental equipment, Fuel transportation/delivery (see question 6 below), extensive barrier material available (similar to HESCO)
4. (STATE) What Host Nation (Georgia) capability (HET, Port Services, Port Security, POD Material Handling Equipment, Fuel)
Yes. Port services/equipment/security available to surge to 110% of port capacity with local personnel hires/contracting, remaining capability must come from military personnel.
5. (EUCOM) What is CSR for JFACC/JFLCC PGM's? GMLRS, JDAM, LGB-GPS,
Check with JTF J3 on availability.
6. (EUCOM/DLA/DESC) Is GA/AZ fuel compatible with MILSPEC JP8?
Yes. GA delivery capacity 1,400,000 gal/day, AZ delivery capacity 800,000 gal/day
7. (STATE) What GA real estate is available to establish a TAA?
The TAAs from OPERATION CASPIAN GUARD I are available.
8. (EUCOM) Is JTF-C responsible for any AZ CSS support?
JTF is not responsible for AZ CSS. CSS is a host nation responsibility. JTF must support CSTs embedded with AZ units.
9. (EUCOM) Is JTF-C responsible for supporting UN Forces in Nagorno-Karabakh?
No
10. (EUCOM) UN Nagorno-Karabakh NFZ – can we cross it?
Humanitarian Assistance and Combat Search and Rescue missions only. No combat loaded aircraft or aircraft returning from strike missions are authorized.
11. (EUCOM/TRANSCOM) USTRANSCOM DDOC – Request its deployment
Authorized. DEPORD in the works.
12. (TRANSCOM) What is the status of Propositioned Equipment Afloat? Has it moved into the Black Sea?
Refer to redeployment timeline as listed on STARTX CD.
13. (TRANSCOM) Request 6 C-17's attached to the JTF for dedicated airlift (through Phase III): Justification is to move heavy armor from Tbilisi to Baku
Approved.
14. (STATE) Can we suspend the Georgia Commerce Non-Interference Agreement for the duration of port operations at Poti/Batumi
Coordinate a consolidated JIACG-JTF recommendation for EUCOM to elevate higher.
15. (EUCOM) What is the status of Constanta AFLD, Romania and Burgas AFLD, Bulgaria, can we use for enroute and logistics support
Yes.
16. (EUCOM) Request 15 C-17 equivalents for Strategic lift from USTRANSCOM in support of equipment movement from GE to the JOA. Dates required C+5 – C+10.
17. (EUCOM) Request 4 additional C-17 equivalents for intratheater lift from C+5 – C+10 to move forces from APODs to Baku Int
IAW Lt Col Knueven, request for 19 C-17s are approved.

Figure 11 JTF J4 Execution RFI's

Notes

1. *Joint Publication (JP) 4-0: Logistics support for Joint Operations*. 6 April 2000, Washington, DC Government Printing Office.
2. Wade, N.M., *The Joint Forces Operational Warfighting Smartbook*. 2003, Lakeland, Fl: The Lightning Press.
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4. *Joint Publication (JP) 4-01.2 Sealift Support to Joint Operation*. 31 Aug 2005, Washington DC: Government Printing Office.
5. Cain, D.A., *Fundamentals of Effects-Based Campaign Planning*. 18 Jan 2006. p. RS 643 Lecture.

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